Discovering the Boundaries:
Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug Labeling Product Liability Actions
BY MARY J. DAVIS
Federally approved prescription drug labeling has not been considered conclusive on the
reasonableness or adequacy of the label for assessing tort liability on the manufacturer because
federal regulations in this field set a minimum standard rather than an optimal one. That
fundamental statement of black-letter tort law is under attack. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has promulgated a regulation which revises the format for prescription
drug labeling, and, in the process, has taken the position that the regulation displaces, or
preempts, state products liability laws that seek to assess liability on the manufacturer for a
label’s warning adequacy. In the FDA’s 100 year history, it has not taken the position that
federal regulations preempt common law tort claims based on prescription drug labeling until
now. This Article explains the applicability of preemption doctrine to prescription drug product
liability actions, explores the importance of the change in FDA position on that doctrine, and
provides direction to courts seeking to discover the boundaries of federal preemption in this
critical area.
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Federally approved prescription drug labeling has not been considered conclusive on the
reasonableness or adequacy of the label for assessing tort liability on the manufacturer because
federal regulations in this field set a minimum standard rather than an optimal one.2 That
fundamental statement of black-letter tort law is under attack. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)3 has promulgated a regulation which revises the format for prescription
drug labeling, and, in the process, has taken the position that the regulation displaces, or
preempts, state products liability laws that seek to assess liability on the manufacturer for a
label’s warning adequacy.4 In the FDA’s 100 year history, it has not taken the position that
federal regulations preempt common law tort claims based on prescription drug labeling until
now.5 This Article explains the applicability of preemption doctrine to prescription drug product
liability actions, explores the importance of the change in FDA position on that doctrine, and
provides direction to courts seeking to discover the boundaries of federal preemption in this
critical area.
I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2002, the FDA filed an amicus curiae brief in Motus v. Pfizer, Inc.,6 in which it
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Witczak v. Pfizer, 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (D. Minn. 2005); Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Oxendine,
649 A.2d 825, 828 (D.C. 1994); Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989); Wells
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asserted that a warning label it had approved for the anti-depressant drug Zoloft preempted the
plaintiff’s product liability action based on the inadequacy of the warning’s risk of suicide from
which the plaintiff died.7 Before Motus, the FDA’s position was that “FDA product approval and
state tort liability usually operate independently, each providing a significant, yet distinct, layer
of consumer protection.”8 An FDA official has explained the more aggressive stance in favor of
preemption: “Our willingness to invoke implied preemption can be traced to the growing
propensity of bad scientific reasoning to seep into court cases involving FDA-regulated
products.”9 After the ensuing three years of debate regarding whether to strengthen the warning
of suicide risk in the labeling of Zoloft and similar anti-depressants, the FDA ultimate required
manufacturers to place a stronger warning, known as a “black box” warning, on the labeling,
highlighting the potential association between the drugs and the risk of suicide.10
7
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A few months before the Motus brief, the FDA took a similar preemption position in another
products liability action which was ultimately decided on other grounds. See Bernhardt v.
Pfizer, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16963 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2002).
At the time of the Motus Amicus Brief, the FDA’s General Counsel and architect of the
changed preemption position, Daniel Troy, had formerly represented Pfizer, Inc. during his time
in private practice. Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Pre-empt Tort Suits: Does it Close Off
Vital Drug Data?, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, vol 26, at p. ___, col 1. (March 1, 2004). Troy
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Troy’s Drug Industry Ties, FDA Week, § 29 (July 16, 2004). See also O’Reilly, supra note at
287 (discussing FDA change in position regarding preemption); Margaret Clune, Stealth Tort
Reform: How the Bush Administration’s Aggressive Use of the Preemption Doctrine Hurts
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After 2002, the FDA continued to posit that approved prescription drug labeling preempts
state tort laws,11 culminating in the promulgation of a new labeling regulation in January 2006
formally taking that position.12 The FDA first published a proposed new labeling regulation in
December 2000 to begin the notice and comment period for revisions to make prescription drug
labeling clearer, more concise, and rid of “legalese.”13 The proposed rule did not address nor
seek comments on its possible preemptive effect on products liability actions.14 The proposed
final regulation, to take effect on June 30, 2006, now takes the position that approved
prescription drug labeling does preempt conflicting state product liability laws.15 Immediately
upon the heels of publication of the final rule, Pfizer asked a federal district judge to vacate an
order denying summary judgment on preemption grounds in another Zoloft case based on the
new FDA preemption position.16
What has prompted the FDA’s change in position on preemption of state product liability
laws and will that change in position have the preemptive effect it seeks? What does the
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence require in assessing the preemptive effect of a rule
that will alter so significantly the balance between federal safety regulation and common law tort
regulatory and compensation principles? Federal agency position on the preemptive effect of
regulations has been given some level of deference in the Supreme Court’s modern preemption

before the FDA’s preemption position was made known in the amicus brief filed in Motus. See
Amicus Curiae Brief of Public Citizen, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (filed
April 21, 2003, available at 2003 WL 22716063). One commentator has suggested that “[m]aybe
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11
Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL 2191804, at * 1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004)(not reported in F.
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Id. at 3922.
14
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15
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34 Prod. Saf. & Liab. Rptr. (BNA) at 53.
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manner, see Letter to Secretary Mike Leavitt, DHHS, from National Conference of State
Legislatures, dated Jan. 13, 2006, noting in particular that the FDA specifically stated in its Dec.
22, 2000 Notice of Proposed Rule Making that the proposed rule did not preempt state law and
that the proposed rule, therefore, did not implicate federalism concerns. See id. Letter available
at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2006/060113Leavitt.html.
16
McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 WL 3752269 (No. 05-1286, D. N. J January 30, 2006); see also
34 Prod. Saf. & Liab. Rptr. (BNA) at 220 (March 6, 2006) (discussing Pfizer’s motion to
reconsider).

jurisprudence.17 The Supreme Court has not, however, answered the question of how agency
position affects the operation of implied preemption doctrine under the federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,18 nor how the historic primacy of state regulation in the area of health and safety is
to be considered in the balance. This Article provides the much needed factual background,
doctrinal explanation, and policy insight to answer these questions.
This Article comprehensively explores the issue of preemption of product liability claims
based on prescription drug labeling. Section II of the Article defines the general regulatory
scheme under the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to place the preemption issue in context.
It also explains the FDA’s proposed new final regulation on prescription drug labeling and some
of the cases which have been used to raise the preemption issue. Section III then describes
general preemption doctrine and gives a detailed treatment of that doctrine in the area of food and
drug regulation. Section IV explains the basis for the recent arguments for implied conflict
preemption under the FDCA for prescription drug labeling cases, critiques those arguments, and
analyzes implied preemption under the FDCA in a manner consistent with a deeper
understanding of the Court’s preemption doctrine.
Section V concludes that implied conflict preemption of pharmaceutical products
liability claims is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s modern preemption jurisprudence. The
FDA’s current preemption position tries to paint with too broad a brush based on the proposed
labeling regulation and significantly undervalues the historic primacy of state law in the field of
public health and safety. There is ample room, according to implied conflict preemption
doctrine, for both state product liability law and federal safety regulation to operate in a
complementary fashion. Is traditional tort law soon to be a thing of the past as it applies to
pharmaceutical products liability actions? This Article answers, “No.” The boundary between
state tort law and federal regulation of prescription drug labeling continues to be well-marked,
preserving the traditional place for the operation of state tort law.
II. PHARMACEUTICAL LABELING REGULATIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD
AND DRUG LAWS
In determining whether certain conduct is negligent, an applicable regulatory standard is
often considered relevant and a jury may consider compliance with a regulation as support for a
finding of no negligence, but it is not required to so find.19 The basic premise of this principle is
that regulators, whether legislators or agency administrators, intend only to set minimum, not
optimal, standards of care.20 A corollary to that basic premise is that courts must be the arbiters
17
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Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 16 cmt b (Proposed Final
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of the content of civil standards of care in the absence of clear statutory or regulatory intent to the
contrary.21
Recent critics of the operation of the tort system have encouraged state legislatures to
provide that compliance with governmental regulations should be treated as more than simply
some evidence of reasonable care; rather, it must be considered either conclusively or
presumptively to establish due care.22 Such reform efforts have been particularly aggressive in
the products liability area where tort litigation often challenges the design or warning of products
that have received some measure of governmental approval.23 It continues to be the “unusual
situation,” however, when a court will rule that compliance with a regulatory standard is
conclusive of a tort standard of care.24
Against the backdrop of this effort to reform state tort laws, product manufacturers
increasingly began in the 1990s to raise federal preemption doctrine as an additional defense to
Liability § 4(b) (1998). For a general discussion of the doctrine, see Symposium, Regulatory
Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); Richard C. Ausness,
The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 2120 (1996). See
also, Teresa Moran Schwarz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right
Balance Between the Two, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 431 (1997); Teresa Moran Schwarz, The Role
of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121 (1988).
21
Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d 777, 779 (Cal. 1943) (“The decision as to what the civil
standard should be still rests with the court, and the standard formulated by a legislative body in a
police regulation . . . becomes the standard to determine civil liability only because the court
accepts it.”).
22
See e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403 (1) (2005); Ind. Code § 34-20-5-1 (1998); Ky Rev. Stat.§
411.310 (1978). See generally Owen, Products Liability Law supra note 1 § 2.4, at p. 93.
23
See Owen, Products Liability Law, supra note at § 14.3 at p. 894 (“About a dozen states have
enacted products liability reform statutes concerning the effect of a manufacturer’s compliance
with a governmental safety standard.”).
See generally David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for
Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform
Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 395, 395 (1996)(“Fairness as well as public
policy demand that compliance with the comprehensive federal regulation of prescription drugs
be conclusive evidence that pharmaceutical manufacturers have discharged their duty to provide
the public with reasonably safe and effective products and appropriate warnings.”); Peter Huber,
Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 277, 334-35 (1985) (“Regulatory agencies are equipped to make the risk comparisons on
which all progressive transformation of the risk environment mut be based. The courts are
simply not qualified to second-guess such decisions; when they choose to do so they routinely
make regressive risk choices.”).
24
Restatement (Third) of Torts; Liability for Physical Harm, § 16 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft,
May 17, 2005). But see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5) (1995)(FDA approval is “conclusive
on the issue of due care for drugs”).

tort liability.25 Federal preemption doctrine rests on the principle that if Congress legislates in a
field, its legislation is supreme and, therefore, displaces state regulation.26 To determine whether
federal legislation indeed operates to preempt state regulation, courts must search for
congressional intent to preempt,27 either through interpretation of an express preemption
provision28 or through the application of implied preemption principles.29 Whether common law
tort actions are preempted has proved to be an especially difficult task because of the typical lack
of evidence of congressional intent to preempt, coupled with the historic primacy of state law in
areas affecting the health and safety of the public.30
Congress rarely expresses the scope of its preemptive intent clearly, especially as it
affects common law tort actions.31 The Supreme Court historically has rejected the notion that
Congress would entirely defeat the operation of traditional state tort laws that had long operated
concurrently with federal regulation without clearly saying so.32 A fortiori, implied intent to
25

See Cipollone v. The Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)(tobacco companies raise
preemption defense regarding warnings on cigarette packaging; limited preemption found based
on express preemption provision); Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
(2000)(automobile manufacturer raises preemption defense regarding requirement for driver’s
side air bags; preemption found based on implied preemption doctrines).
26
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires federal law supremacy. U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
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27
Cipollone v. The Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992)(the intent of Congress is the
‘ultimate touchstone’ of preemption analysis, citing Malone v. White Motor Co., 435 U.S. 497,
505 (1978)). See also Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws,
66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 181, 198 (2004)(hereafter Davis, On Preemption); Richard C. Ausness,
Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Jurisprudence Since
Cipollone, 92 Ky. L. J. 913, 917-919 (2003-2004).
28

The FDCA does not contain a general express preemption provision. Caraker v. Sandoz
Pharms. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (S. D. Ill. 2001); McCallister v. Purdue Pharms L.P., 164 F.
Supp. 2d 783 (S.D. W. Va. 2001); Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 2002 WL 181972 at * 2 (S. D.
Ind. Jan. 28, 2002)(portion of FDA dealing with pharmaceuticals does not contain preemption
provision). See also, O’ Reilly, supra note at 290; Geiger & Rosen, supra note at 400.
29
See infra notes and accompanying text.
30
See infra notes and accompanying text. See also Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption
in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 967, 971 (2002) (history of preemption
doctrine)(hereafter Davis, Unmasking the Presumption). See also, Davis, On Preemption, supra
note at 200-202 (2004) (discussing implied preemption doctrine).
31
Davis, On Preemption, supra note at 183-184, 198-202. See also Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption, supra note at 990-997 (explaining Supreme Court’s late twentieth century
preemption cases involving common law tort actions); and Owen, Products Liability, supra note
at § 14.4 at pp. 895 - 901 (general discussion of presumption against preemption of traditional
state health and safety laws).
32
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S.
72, 83 (1990).

preempt traditional state tort doctrines has rarely been found.33
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)34 does not have a general express
preemption provision,35 though Congress has on occasion written preemption provisions into the
food and drug laws.36 Implied preemption doctrine, therefore, will necessarily apply to the
prescription drug labeling cases. Implied preemption is recognized in limited categories of cases:
(1) when the broad sweep of the federal statute’s scope suggests a total occupation of the
regulatory field; and (2) when inconsistent state regulation would either make it impossible to
comply with a federal mandate or would frustrate the purposes behind Congress’ legislation.37
State common law tort actions historically have not been considered either directly regulatory or
inconsistent with Congress’ purposes, and, therefore, typically not impliedly preempted under
these doctrines.38
Implied conflict preemption principles require an assessment of whether federal
objectives are frustrated by actually conflicting state regulation. Consequently, an understanding
of the regulatory scheme in issue and its objectives, both in general and as to the specific
regulation in issue, is critical to an application of implied conflict preemption doctrine. The
federal objectives must, therefore, be discerned; the source of those objectives explored, and the
nature of the regulatory scheme understood.39 The objectives of the FDCA in prescription drug
33

See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861, (2000) (finding implied
conflict preemption of state tort common law damages action). Geier is discussed in more detail
infra notes and accompanying text. See also Ausness, supra note at 928 (“[I]n the years prior to
Cipollone the Court generally refused to preempt state tort claims, even where there was an
important federal regulatory interest at stake.”).
34
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2006).
35
See supra note 25.
36
Congress has enacted a number of specific preemption provisions in the food and drug laws,
suggesting it is capable of doing so when it chooses, but none providing preemption for
prescription drug labeling. For examples of specific preemption provisions, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§ 379r (2006) (national uniformity for nonprescription drugs)(enacted 1997), and 21 U.S.C. §
379s (2006)(preemption for labeling or packaging of cosmetics)(enacted 1997). Both of these
preemption provisions also contain a clause which saves the operation of product liability laws
and states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect any action or
the liability of any person under the product liability law of any State.” 21 U.S.C. § 379r(e); 21
U.S.C. § 379s(e).
37
See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-231 (1947). See generally, Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption, supra note at 969-971, 990-97; Ausness, supra note at 919.
38
Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 990-993 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
important early cases on implied preemption of common law damages actions); Ausness, supra
note at 922-924 (discussing implied conflict preemption in early preemption cases).
39
See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (discussing assessment of
federal objectives in implied preemption inquiry.) See also Davis, Unmasking the Presumption,
supra note at 979.

labeling and the nature of the regulatory scheme are the subject of the next subsection.
A. Regulation under Federal Food and Drug Laws
Federal regulation of food and drugs occurred in this country as early as the midnineteenth century but began in earnest in 1906 with enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act.40
The 1906 Act was prompted by concerns raised by state food and drug regulators over
adulterated and misbranded food products moving in interstate commerce and contaminating the
food and drug supply.41 State regulators encouraged, indeed implored,42 the national government
to create a federal agency because of concerns over their inability to reach the interstate sale of
fraudulent products and, thus, to protect consumers from them.43 Until the federal legislation, the
states had traditionally regulated the safety of food and drugs since the earliest days of our
country’s history.44
The modern version of the federal food and drug regulatory scheme dates from the FDCA
of 1938.45 The 1938 Act was adopted to protect the public health by enforcing certain standards
of purity and effectiveness as well as preventing the sale of misbranded or adulterated products.46
The 1938 legislation extended control over more products and enlarged and stiffened the
penalties for its disobedience.47 A variety of amendments to the 1938 Act over the ensuing
years48 have added to the complexity of the regulatory scheme but its primary purpose has never
40

For a history of the early regulation of food and drugs in this country, see 1 James T. O’Reilly,
Food and Drug Admin. §§ 3:1 - 3.4 (2d. ed. 2005)(hereafter O’Reilly, Food and Drug Admin.
2d).
41
1 O’Reilly, Food and Drug Admin. 2d at § 3:2.
42
See Regler, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 3
(1933). See also O’Reilly, Food and Drug Admin 2d at § 25:1. For additional discussion of the
history of the FDCA, see the FDA’s website, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history.
43
O’Reilly, Food and Drug Admin. 2d at § 25:1 (overview of relationship between the FDA and
state governments).
44
Id. at § 25:1.
45
21 U.S.C. § 301, 331 (2006) (defining prohibited acts of adulteration and misbranding). See
United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (discussing purposes of FDCA); United States v.
Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914) (discussing similar purposes of predecessor
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906).
46
United States v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 457 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1972); Pharmaceutical Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Food and Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Del. 1980).
47
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); Research Labs. v. United States 167 F.2d
410 (9th Cir. 1948).
48
See, e.g, Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub.L. 108-282, Title
II, § 201, 118 Stat. 905 (Aug. 2, 2004); Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. 107-09, §
1, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002); Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103417, § 1(a), 108 Stat. 4325 )1994); Nutrition Labeling and education Act Amendments of 1993,
Pub. L. 103-80, § 1, 107 Stat. 773 (1993); and Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94295, § 1(a), 90 Stat. 539 (1976).

changed–protection of the public health.
The FDCA is administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)49 which
regulates the safety of foods, drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics in a number of ways. The
key protection against the marketing of ineffective or unsafe prescription pharmaceutical
products comes from the New Drug Approval process that new drugs must complete before they
can be marketed.50 If a prescription drug fails to comply with any applicable regulation, that
product may, as a result, be considered misbranded or adulterated under the Act.51 Penalties for
selling an adulterated or misbranded drug or device may be assessed against the seller,52 noncompliant products may be seized,53 and injunctive relief is available in federal district court.54
To be misbranded, a regulated product’s labeling must be “false or misleading in any
particular.”55 Proper labeling includes certain identifying information, such as the name and
place of business of the manufacturer, and prominent placement of information on the label to
insure readability.56 Proper labeling also includes the established name of the drug and
information on the proportion of active ingredients and their established names, if any.57
Most importantly, proper labeling includes “adequate directions for use” and “adequate

49

21 U.S.C. § 393 (2006).
Id. § 355 (new drug application requirements). See also 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (regulations for new
drug approval applications). Stories about the expense of the drug application process are
legendary and are the backdrop to many calls for reform of the process. See, e.g., Clifton Leaf,
How our National Obsession with Drug Safety is Killing People – And What We Can Do About
It, Fortune, at 107 (February 20, 2006).
50

Similarly, the Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA contain a complex regulatory
mechanism for the marketing of medical devices. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 360). These amendments create a
three-part classification of medical devices and regulate their marketing accordingly. 21 U.S.C. §
360(c). For a thorough discussion of the regulatory scheme of the MDA, see Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)(analyzing preemption under the MDA). See also Richard C. Ausness,
“After You, My Dear Alphonse?”: Should the Courts Defer to the FDA’s New Interpretation of
Section 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, cite. (discussing preemption under the
Medical Device Amendments). For further discussion of Medtronic, see infra notes and
accompanying text.
51
21 U.S.C. § 351 (adulterated drugs and devices defined); § 352 (misbranded drugs and devices
defined) (2006).
52
Id. at § 333.
53
Id. at § 334.
54
Id. at § 332.
55
Id. at § 352 (a).
56
Id. at § 352(b), (c).
57
Id. at § 352(e).

warnings against use . . . where its use may be dangerous to health, or against unsafe dosage.”58
Tort liability for prescription drugs is based primarily on allegations of inadequate warnings of
risk or improper use on the labeling such that the prescribing physician is ill-advised about the
potential harms from use of the drug.59 The physician acts as the “learned intermediary” between
the manufacturer and the patient, for whom the information about risk and appropriate use is
intended but who cannot understand its technicalities.60 State common law tort actions
predicated on negligence and strict products liability require the exercise of reasonable care by
manufacturers in warning physicians of unreasonable risks of harm posed to their patients by the
use of the drug.61 How the FDA defines what constitutes an “adequate” warning and how such
warnings approved is treated in the next sub-section.
B. Pharmaceutical Labeling Regulations
Prescription drug labeling is intended to communicate information to the physician who
then prescribes the product and communicates with her patient about its use.62 A number of
sources are available for physicians to access information about the prescription drugs they may
consider for treatment of their patients’ medical conditions.63 “Labeling” is the set of documents
58

Id. at § 352 (f).
See Madden and Owen on Products Liability , supra note at §§ 22:9, 22:10. See Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966)(one of earliest cases discussing manufacturer
duty to warn physician, as learned intermediary).
Liability for the defective design, or formula, of a prescription drug is not the subject of
this article. That topic is the subject of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 6 (1998),and its predecessor, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k
(1965). A number of cases and scholarly articles address design defect liability for
pharmaceutical products. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); George
Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109
YALE L. J. 1087 (2000); and James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, Drug Designs are Different,
111 YALE L. J. 151 (2000).
60
Madden and Owen on Products Liability, supra note at § 22:11, p. 574-75.
61
Madden and Owen on Products Liability, supra note at § 22:8, p. 564-65. Many academic
commentators and some courts have criticized the learned intermediary doctrine as it applies to
prescription drugs that are widely advertised to the consumer, otherwise known as the direct-toconsumer advertised product. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (rejecting
learned intermediary doctrine in case of direct to consumer advertised contraceptive device);
Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort Liability
for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 92 (2002); Wiseman, Another
Factor in the “Decisional Calculus:” The Learned Intermediary Doctrine, the Physician-Patient
Relationship, and Direct-to-Consumer Marketing, 52 S.C. L. REV. 993 (2001).
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Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). See Madden and Owen on
Products Liability, supra note at § 22:10, p. 568-69.
63
For example, the Physician’s Desk Reference, or PDR, is a compilation of the labeling inserts
that accompany prescription drugs for easy physician access. “The PDR is an annual publication,
a compendium of information about all ethical drugs, which reproduces the information from the
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that accompany the drug to the prescriber and the end user.64 The FDA must assure that the
statutorily required information is adequately communicated to those users but it does not create
the labeling. It approves the labeling provided to it by the manufacturer after review of the
manufacturer’s application pursuant to the New Drug Approval regulations.65 A number of
regulations have been adopted by the FDA to accomplish its task.
The FDA regulations include general requirements on the content and format of labeling
for prescription drugs.66 These regulations then refer to more specific requirements detailing
what is to be included in the required labeling.67 The specific requirements indicate the data that
must be included, the order in which it must be included, and the indication and usage
information that must be provided.68 The labeling regulation states that “serious adverse
reactions and potential safety hazards” must be described.69 New drug applications are required
to contain copies of the labeling proposed by the manufacturer70 as well as a summary of the
contents of that labeling.71
The FDA described this labeling formation process in its amicus brief in Motus: “FDA’s
decision as to appropriate labeling is based on the evidence submitted by the applicant, as well as
on the agency’s review of other relevant information. Commonly, a drug manufacturer and FDA
will discuss in detail the proposed drug labeling, including the various warnings to be placed on
the proposed drug labeling . . . Based on the known scientific evidence, appropriate warnings are
drafted to express the known risks, while avoiding the statement of unsubstantiated risks that
may unnecessarily deter use of the drug.”72 The labeling formulation process is one of give-andtake with oversight by the FDA according to its implementing regulations with the burden on the
manufacturer to submit information in support of its application.
Changes to approved labeling are permitted under certain circumstances. A manufacturer
is permitted to make certain changes only after first obtaining prior FDA approval for the
labeling change.73 Manufacturers may make unilateral labeling changes without prior FDA
approval “to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a

package inserts of all of them. The PDR is found in the offices of most United States
physicians.” MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note at § 22:11, at p. 575.
See also http://www.PDR.net for the online version of the PDR.
64
O’Reilly, Food & Drug Admin 2d, supra note at § 15:9.
65
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)(defining application requirements for new drug approvals).
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21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2006).
67
Id. at § 201.57.
68
Id. at § 201.57(a), (b), ( c), (d).
69
Id. at § 201.57(e), (f).
70
21 C.F.R. § 314.50(e)(2)(ii)(2006).
71
Id. at § 314.50(c)(2)(i).
72
Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note at 5.
73
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (“major changes” include changes in the qualitative or quantitative
formulation of the drug or changes that may affect drug substance).

serious hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been proved.”74 The FDA need
not approve the labeling before the manufacturer revises it under this section, but a supplemental
application, a Supplemental Submission for Changes Being Effected, or SSCBE, to effect the
change must be submitted.75 Such a unilateral labeling change has been called a “safety valve”
because it encourages manufacturer labeling changes to permit the addition of new warnings
when severe risks become known that were not anticipated when the drug was originally
approved.76 The FDA must ultimately approve the labeling change,77 but the regulation “was
promulgated precisely to allow drug-makers to quickly strengthen label warnings when evidence
of new side effects are discovered.”78 Manufacturers initiate labeling changes but commonly do
not implement them without FDA approval.79
The FDA’s new proposed final labeling regulation takes the position that any labeling
approved by the FDA acts to preempt state common law tort actions so that the manufacturer is
not placed in the position of having to change labeling in response to possible tort liability, but
may rest on prior FDA approval of labeling. The new regulation is discussed in the next subsection.
C. Proposed New Regulation on Labeling for Prescription Drugs
The proposed new final regulation alters the requirements for the labeling of prescription
drugs and is intended to make that labeling clearer, more concise, and more usable for physicians
and patients.80 The new regulation has the following features: (1) introduces a “Highlights”
74

Id. at § 201.57(e). This section of the regulation also provides the FDA with authority to
require a “prominently displayed box” with particularly important warning or risk information
whose location is specified by the FDA. Id. This is the “black box warning” of which people
speak.
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Id. at §314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A). See also Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726 (D. Minn.
2005) (discussing SSCBE process and its effect); Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL 3631155 (S. D.
Tex., November 22, 2004) (same).
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O’Reilly, supra note at 293-94 (“FDA’s regulations and policies encourage prompt action by
the drug companies to improve their warnings when the data justifies such enhancements.”) See
also Werner v. Upjohn, Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980).
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21 C.F.R. at § 314.70(c)(6)(iii).
78
Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 729 (D. Minn. 2005) (citing 30 Fed. Reg. 59290
(Jan. 30, 1965) and 44 Fed. Reg. 37447 (June 6, 1979)). See also Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm.
Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018 1033-1034 (S.D. Ill. 2001)(discussing manufacturer’s ability to
supplement warnings under FDA regulations).
79
See 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (January 24, 2006)(discussion of labeling procedures in comments
to new proposed final labeling regulation); See also Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra
note at 17 (discussing ultimate FDA approval required for all labeling changes).
80
71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (January 24, 2006). See also FDA Announces Final Rule on the
Requirements for Prescribing Information for Drug and Biological Products, Press Release (Jan.
18, 2006). The labeling regulation change was prompted by “an increase in the length, detail,
and complexity of prescription drug labeling, making it harder for health care practitioners to

section to labeling which will provide immediate access to a drug’s most commonly referenced
material;81 (2) reorders and reorganizes the contents of labeling, introducing graphical
requirements; and (3) makes warning and adverse reaction information more accessible.82 To
assist manufacturers in complying with the new regulation, the FDA has produced four Guidance
Documents in addition to the almost 200-page regulation with comments.83
The regulation lists the general categories of information to be placed into the new
“Highlights” section. Those categories include: a Boxed Warning, Recent Major Changes,
Indications and Usage, Contraindications, and Warnings and Precautions.84 Each manufacturer is
required to choose the information that must be included within each of these sections, including
the “Warning and Precautions” section of the new labeling.85 “Judgment will continue to be
necessary” in deciding which information must be emphasized.86
Physicians and health care practitioners expressed “unequivocal enthusiasm” for the
“Highlights” section while manufacturers were either opposed or “strongly” opposed to it.87
Manufacturer opposition was based, in part, on the obligation to pick the important warning or
other information to include while omitting other information which might cause the
“Highlights” section to be misleading.88 Similarly, several comments suggested more specific
criteria were needed to enable manufacturers to choose consistently the appropriate information
to be included in the now central “Highlights” section,89 at least in part to prevent competitive
disadvantage.90 The FDA, acknowledging the concerns, suggested that it is “essential for FDA to
review and approve most proposed changes to the information in Highlights” and consequently is

find specific information and to discern the most critical information.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 3922.
81
71 Fed. Reg. at 3923.
82
Id. The final regulation applies to new and recently approved drugs, approved after 2001, and
the former labeling requirements will continue to apply to older approved drugs. Id. at 39233926.
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Id. at 3929.
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Id. at 3924.
85
Id. at 3930. FDA's guidance document on “Warnings and Precautions,” intended to assist
manufacturers with how to determine the content of the “Warnings and Precautions” section,
states that it “does not establish legally enforceable responsibilities. Instead, Guidances describe
the Agency's current thinking on a topic and should be viewed only as recommendations, unless
specific regulatory or statutory requirements are cited.” See Guidance for Industry, Warnings and
Precautions, Contraindications, and Boxed Warnings Sections of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products – Content and Format, at
www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/indes.htm (January 18, 2006).
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71 Fed. Reg. at 3932.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 3932.
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Id..

revising its regulations on supplementing approvals.91
Consistent with the former regulation, the new regulation requires manufacturers to revise
labeling to include warnings about “clinically significant hazards” as soon as there is reasonable
evidence of a “causal association” with the drug.92 This language seems to require greater
evidence of a connection between a drug and a risk about which a warning must be given
unilaterally than its predecessor93 though a causal relationship still is not required. Manufacturers
continue to have “permission to add risk information to the Full Prescribing Information (FPI)
without first obtaining FDA approval.”94
Manufacturers maintain some discretion under the new regulation to choose what to say
in their labeling and how to say, with considerable FDA oversight as before. Perhaps it is this
necessary exercise of manufacturer discretion that prompted the FDA to include a section in the
comments to the final regulation about the product liability implications of the proposed rule.95
D. Proposed Preemptive Effect of the New Labeling Regulation
The FDA’s historical position has been that common law tort liability is an important
component of the regulation of prescription drugs and that federal regulation is not intended to
displace it.96 The comments to the proposed final regulation argue, however, that product
liability lawsuits have “directly threatened the agency’s ability to regulate manufacturer
dissemination of risk information for prescription drugs.”97 The FDA favored the concurrent
operation of state tort law for almost the entire first century of its existence based on (1) its
91

Id. at 3932. In particular, the FDA is revising 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii), the “safety valve”
mentioned earlier at supra note , which permits a manufacturer to alter a label to introduce new
and important safety information. Id.
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Proposed Final Regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a)(5), states: “In accordance with §§ 314.70 . . .
the labeling must be revised to include a warning about a clinically significant hazard as soon as
there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with a drug; a causal relationship need not
have been definitely established.” See 71 Fed. Reg. at 3990.
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See supra note and accompanying text.
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71 Fed. Reg. at 3934, 3969.
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Id. at 3933.
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See supra notes and accompanying text. See also Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F.
Supp. 2d 1018, 1036-1037 (S.D. Ill. 2001)(FDA historical position against preemption
chronicled).
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71 Fed. Reg. at 3933. The FDA cites three cases which arguably do not call for preemption
alarm. Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2004), ultimately
found that a FDA warning on nicotine replacement therapy drugs conflicted with, and thus
preempted, a state warning, despite a savings clause in Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 specifically protecting the requirement. Motus v. Pfizer, Inc. 358
F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) was resolved in favor of the manufacturer on causation. In re Paxil
Litigation, 296 F. Supp.2d 1374 (J.P.M.L. 2003), is in multi-district litigation consolidated
proceedings.

inability to anticipate every way a consumer could be injured by the products it regulated, and (2)
the lack of a federal remedy to provide redress for injured consumers.98
The proposed final labeling regulation does not contain a specific section that addresses
preemption but discusses the subject in the commentary. The FDA has formally regulated on
preemption before, in its implementation of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the
FDCA.99 In that statute, Congress included an express preemption provision which delegated to
the FDA the authority to exempt state regulations from its preemptive effect and which permitted
the FDA to assess the preemptive effect that the MDA and regulations promulgated pursuant to it
would have on state laws.100 As the Supreme Court said in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,101 “FDA
regulations implementing that grant of authority establish a process by which States or other
individuals may request an advisory opinion from the FDA regarding whether a particular state
requirement is pre-empted by the statute.”102
Unlike the formally promulgated regulation under the MDA, the proposed new
prescription drug labeling regulation does not contain a section on its preemptive effect but,
rather, discusses product liability issues and preemption in the commentary.103 That discussion
reiterates the litigation positions taken in Motus and other product liability cases104 which are
98

Motus Amicus Brief of Public Citizen, supra note at 12 (“[W]hen Congress was considering
legislation that ultimately was enacted as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, it made its
intentions clear. Congress specifically rejected a proposal to include a private right of action for
damages caused by faulty or unsafe products regulated under the Act on the ground that such a
right of action already existed under state common law.” Citing Hearings Before Subcomm. of
Comm. on Commerce on S. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 400, 403 (1933)). See also Borden Co. v.
Liddy, 200 F. Supp. 221, 225 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (federal food labeling regulations provided a
minimum level of safety which could be supplemented by more stringent state regulations);
Porter, supra note 7 at .
99
21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006)(express preemption provision of Medical Device Amendments of
1976); 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 to 808.5 (2006) (regulations implementing preemption provision). For
a discussion of preemption under the Medical Device Amendments, see infra notes and
accompanying text.
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21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)
101
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (interpreting express preemption provision of
MDA; finding no preemption of common law damages claims).
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Id. at 496.
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71 Fed. Reg. at 3969. The National Conference on State Legislatures has expressed opposition
“to the inclusion of language that would preempt state product liability laws” in the final
regulation, and to the process by which the preemption language was included. See Letter to
Secretary Mike Leavitt, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, from National
Conference of State Legislatures, Re: Food and Drug Administration Final Rule on the
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, dated January
13, 2006.
104
71 Fed. Reg. at 3934: “In order to more fully address the comments expressing concern about
the product liability implications of revising the labeling for prescription drugs, we believe it

inconsistent with the historical FDA position. To more fully understand the proposed
preemption position taken in the labeling regulation, a deeper appreciation of the Motus case is
necessary.
The amicus brief filed by the United States in Motus v. Pfizer, Inc. takes the position that
state common law tort actions based on a prescription drug’s warning inadequacies are
preempted because any such claim would require a warning that the FDA has concluded is not
required, thereby rendering the drug misbranded under the FDCA.105 In Motus, plaintiff alleged
that the warnings on the anti-depressant Zoloft were inadequate under state product liability laws
because they did not emphasize sufficiently the association between use of the drug and an
increased risk of suicide.106 Prior to and in the course of approving Zoloft in 1991, the FDA
explored the potential associations between the use of SSRI’s and suicide that had been raised
regarding other SSRI’s, particularly Prozac.107 Those concerns caused the FDA to convene a
committee of experts, the Psycho-pharmacological Drugs Advisory Committee (“PDAC”)108 to
consider the issue. In 1991, the PDAC unanimously found that “[o]n the question whether ‘there
is credible evidence to support a conclusion the antidepressant drugs cause the emergence and/or
intensification of suicidality and/or other violent behaviors,’” there was no such evidence.109 The
FDA subsequently made suggestions to Pfizer regarding warning language it should incorporate
in Zoloft labeling, asking Pfizer to “[p]lease use proposed text verbatim” which it did.110
Pfizer moved for summary judgment in Motus on the basis of implied conflict
preemption.111 The trial court denied the motion finding that the federal regulation which permits
a manufacturer to alter a warning without prior FDA approval defeated any conflict with state
product liability laws.112 The trial court was persuaded as well by the FDA Commissioner’s
statement, in support of that regulation, that supported the role of unilateral manufacturer
would be useful to set forth in some detail the arguments made in those amicus briefs.” The
regulation suggests that preemption of state tort law is the FDA’s “longstanding view” on
preemption, id., but that description is inconsistent with prior statements of the FDA.
105
Motus Brief of United States, supra note at 3.
106
Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F. Supp.2d 1085, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2001)(denial of summary
judgment on issue of preemption), rev’d on other grounds, 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004). The
District Court’s opinion contains a lengthy discussion of the regulatory history of Zoloft and
other SSRIs.
107
127 F.Supp.2d at 1090.
108
Id. at 1088, 1090.
109
Id. at 1090. During the PDAC proceedings, the Director of the Division stated concern that an
unintended side effect of modifying the labeling to raise an increased concern over suicidality
“might be a reduction in the use of antidepressants in the treatment of depression, and that the
result might cause overall injury to the public health.” Id.
110
Id. at 1088. Plaintiff contended that Pfizer drafted the ultimately approved labeling language,
not the FDA. Id.
111
Id. at 1093. Pfizer also argued for implied conflict preemption based on the impossibility of
being able to comply with both the federal and state requirements. Id. at 1092.
112
Id. at 1094 (referring to 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)).

labeling changes to increase information provided to health care providers and enhance public
safety.113 In addition, the trial court noted that while the FDA concluded that no labeling change
was required based on its review of the scientific evidence, the “FDA never stated that it would
be impermissible to include additional warnings.”114
In support of Pfizer’s appeal of the denial of summary judgment, the United States argued
that while FDA regulations permit a drug’s manufacturer to alter or strengthen a warning,
“ultimately, however, FDA, not each state court system applying its own standards, must approve
the warning.”115 The United States disagreed with the suggestion that to constitute an actual
conflict for preemption the FDA must reject a proposed warning change formally because “all
imaginable warnings that could reasonably have been read as describing or alluding to [the
association with suicidality] would have been false or misleading for lack of scientific support
and therefore in conflict with federal law.”116 The brief concludes that any state common law
damages action that resulted in requiring that a warning be given that was not approved would
have misbranded the drug per se, thereby subjecting the manufacturer to penalties under the
FDCA.117
The FDA’s position assumes that misbranding liability would be automatic. However, as
a number of courts have recognized, the FDA must make a determination that a drug is
misbranded and then seek injunctive relief from the federal district court before a final
determination on the issue is reached and penalties ensue.118 The manufacturer is entitled to a
jury trial on the issue, establishing that the ultimate decision on misbranding is not the FDA’s to
make.119
The proposed final labeling regulation furthers the preemption position by generally
113

Id. at 1094. The FDA Commissioner had stated, in support of the then current regulation:

The commissioner also advises that these labeling requirements do not prohibit a manufacturer . .
. from warning health care professionals whenever possibly harmful adverse effects associated
with the use of the drug are discovered. The addition to labeling . . . of additional warnings . . . is
not prohibited by these regulations . . . In the case of an approved NDA, 314.8(d) [now
§314.70(c)(2)(i)] permits the addition to the drug's labeling . . . of information about a hazard
without advance approval by the FDA.
Id. at 1094 (citing 21 Fed. Reg. 37447 (1979)).
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127 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
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Id. at 13.
116
Id. at 14.
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Id. at 16-17.
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Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc.,377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732 (D. Minn. 2005). See also Amicus Brief of
Public Citizen, supra note at 16 (filed April 21, 2003) (threat of enforcement action not enough to
create a conflict; filing of enforcement does not guarantee that the FDA will prevail).
119
21 U.S.C. § 332-334 (2006) (jury trial available on issue regarding injunctions, criminal
penalties, and seizures).

arguing that state law actions frustrate the agency’s implementation of federal objectives.120 The
FDA disagrees with the assertion widely made that its labeling requirements are “minimum
safety standards” and charges that characterization as a “misunderstanding of the Act.”121 The
FDA takes the position that its regulations can establish both a floor and a ceiling.122 When
additional labeling requirements may not be more protective of patients, “they can erode and
disrupt the careful and truthful representation of benefits and risks that prescribers need to make
appropriate judgments about drug use. Exaggeration of risk could discourage appropriate use of
a beneficial drug.”123 The overwarning concern is supported in the regulation’s commentary by a
case in which a state court found federal preemption of an inconsistent state regulation, not a
product liability action.124 The FDA has expressed the overwarning concern in recent medical
device cases seeking greater preemptive effect of its regulations.125
After articulating the arguments in favor of preemption, the FDA identifies those claims
which would be impliedly preempted by its proposed labeling regulation.126 It protects
manufacturers for choices they make about what to include in the new “Highlights” section of the
regulation.127 It also seeks to codify its position in Motus that if a label was proposed to the FDA
and ultimately not required by the time plaintiff claims it should have been, the plaintiff’s claim
based on a failure to warn is preempted.128
The FDA notes that its position on preemption in the final regulation is, in essence, a
litigation position129 which may change depending on the factual circumstances presented. The
FDA acknowledges that some state common law damages actions will not be preempted130 but it
never speaks directly to the potential complementary way in which common law damages actions
operate with FDA regulations by permitting compensation for injury and thereby creating an
additional incentive to public safety.
The FDA claims that existing preemption principles undergird its preemption analysis.
The proposed new regulation affects new and recently approved drugs, but the former regulation
continues to apply to older drugs.131 Consequently, the FDA is attempting to alter its historical
position against preemption and apply its new position retroactively to all drugs approved and
120
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Id. at 3934-35.
122
Id. at 3935.
123
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regulated under the former regulation. Because of the FDA’s attempt to distance itself from its
historical position against preemption and, at the same time, rely on existing preemption
principles, those principles must be fully explored. The next Section provides that exploration.
III. PREEMPTION UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG LAWS
The Supreme Court has addressed the scope of federal preemption since the earliest days
of the regulatory state. While this Article will emphasize preemption analysis under the food and
drug laws, the Court’s preemption doctrine generally has been the subject of much academic
interest132 and that scholarship informs the following discussion.
A. Preemption Doctrine Under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906133
Shortly after enactment of the first federal food and drug law, questions arose regarding
how much state authority it displaced. In Savage v. Jones,134 the Court was asked to determine
whether the federal legislation affected an effort by the State of Indiana to require the inspection
and additional labeling of an animal feed additive that federal regulators had concluded was not a
food and, therefore, not subject to the federal Act’s requirements.135 The seller of the food
additive claimed that it was marketed as an herbal treatment for animals, not as feed, and
consequently escaped federal regulations.136 Further, because Congress had regulated in the field,
the seller argued that the states were entirely foreclosed from regulating.137
The Court, after rejecting the argument that the Indiana statute was unconstitutional
because of its interference with interstate commerce,138 noted that Congress did not expressly
declare its intention to prevent the States from regulating within the subject of food and drugs.139
The Court then described the applicable implied preemption inquiry:
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Symposium, Federal Preemption of State Tort Law: The Problem of Medical Drugs and
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For when the question is whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire
scheme of the statute must, of course, be considered, and that which needs must
be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the
act cannot otherwise be accomplished–if its operation within its chosen field else
must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect–the state law
must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power.
But the intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its police power as
to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the
mere fact the Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a
limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of
Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflictwith the law of the state. 140
The Indiana statute was not impliedly preempted because of two corollary principles the Court
articulated: (1) Congress’ implied purpose to preempt must be clearly manifested, and (2) the
repugnance or conflict between the congressional purpose and the state regulation must be
“direct and positive,” so that the two acts could not be reconciled.141 The Indiana statute was
found not to be in actual conflict with the federal regulation because it did not impose conflicting
standards nor did it oppose federal authority–it rather added consistent, but more rigorous,
regulation.142
Savage v. Jones was decided decades before the onslaught of post-Depression era
economic regulation and post-World War II civil rights and public interest regulatory.
Preemption doctrine was in its infancy. Nevertheless, Savage is an important foundational case
because it articulated implied conflict preemption doctrine in an early food and drug regulation
matter. The Court continues to refer to Savage’s articulation of implied conflict preemption
analysis, suggesting its continuing influence.143
Building on its discussion of implied preemption in Savage, the Court in 1913 decided
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McDermott v. Wisconsin.144 In McDermott, Wisconsin had enacted a food labeling provision
which appeared to be in direct conflict with a federal regulation. The Secretary of Agriculture, in
charge of enforcing the food and drug laws, had concluded that the defendant’s corn syrup label
was in compliance with the federal statute’s misbranding provision.145 The Wisconsin statute
required that, before sale, the complying federal label had to be removed and replaced with an
alternate label.146 To comply with the Wisconsin statute, therefore, the seller had to remove the
federal label and, possibly, suffer penalties as a result of misbranding.147 This is the first case in
which the federal government, through the Secretary of Agriculture, took the position that a
federal food or drug regulation preempted a state regulation.
The Court concluded that the state’s attempt to regulate exclusively was an improper
interference with Congress’ authority.148 The Court explained:
Conceding to the state the authority to make regulations consistent with the
Federal law for the further protection of its citizens against impure and
misbranded food and drugs, we think to permit such regulation as is embodied in
this statute is to permit a state to discredit and burden legitimate Federal
regulations of interstate commerce, to destroy rights arising out of the Federal
statute which have accrued both to the government and the shipper, and to impair
the effect of a Federal law. . . .149
The problem with the Wisconsin statute was its attempt at exclusivity: the regulated seller could
not comply with both labeling requirements. Such “impossibility” of dual compliance has since
become a category of implied conflict preemption which the Court identifies but rarely applies.150
B. Early Preemption Doctrine under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938
Like its predecessor, the FDCA of 1938 does not have a generally applicable express
preemption provision.151 Therefore, preemption under the FDCA, whether of state and local
regulations or common law tort actions, must proceed under implied preemption doctrine.
Preemption doctrine during the years between the early twentieth century and the midtwentieth century is generally marked by a more generous attitude toward state regulation.152
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During this time, the Supreme Court defined implied preemption doctrine more clearly and rarely
found it. During the period from the 1940s to the 1980s, implied preemption doctrine coalesced
into the now-standard categories of occupation of the field preemption and conflict
preemption.153
Occupation of the field preemption occurs where Congress’ legislation is so
comprehensive that it occupies the entire field, displacing all state law.154 An important early
example of such field preemption is Hines v. Davidowitz.155 Hines found that a federal alien
registration statute preempted all state regulation because of the national interest, based on the
presence of foreign affairs concerns, in a uniform registration mechanism.156 The Court found
implied congressional intent to legislate fully and exclusively because of the core national
interest at stake.157
Conflict preemption occurs most frequently when the state law “stands as an obstacle” to
the accomplishment of federal objectives and, therefore, must yield.158 Preemption issues under
the FDCA have typically involved state or local regulation which allegedly impacted the federal
regulatory scheme. For example, in Cloverleaf Butter v. Patterson,159 Alabama officials seized
substantial quantities of packing stock butter, used by Cloverleaf Butter Company in the
manufacture of processed butter sold in interstate commerce, because of concerns over its quality
under state food and drug regulation.160 The federal Department of Agriculture regulated the use
of the packing stock butter161 and was not authorized to seize the product until after it was
manufactured and moved in interstate commerce, when it might be considered adulterated.162
Consequently, the state law required seizure at a time which the federal law did not permit. The
Company sought an injunction against the Alabama officials prohibiting them from seizing the
packing stock butter.163
The Supreme Court, relying on Savage and McDermott, concluded that the Alabama law
was preempted.164 The Court stated, “When the prohibition of state action is not specific but
inferable from the scope and purpose of the federal legislation, it must be clear that the federal
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provisions are inconsistent with those of the state to justify thwarting the state regulation.”165
Recognizing that the line distinguishing cases of inconsistency is narrow, the Court found the
case to be more like McDermott in which the state law prohibited what the federal law
permitted.166 The Court distinguished Savage because the state law in issue in that case required
additional disclosures that the federal law neither required nor prohibited.167 In Savage, federal
law was agnostic on the value of the state regulation; in McDermott and Cloverleaf Butter,
federal law appeared to be affirmatively against the state’s regulatory choice.
The majority’s finding of implied conflict preemption in Cloverleaf Butter was based on
a minimal conflict168 and reflects a broad definition of actual conflict in which the Court rejects
the State’s argument that the two regulatory schemes could operate harmoniously.169 The Court’s
broad definition of the boundaries of federal authority was intended to minimize clashes between
the regulating authorities and free the regulated industry from inconsistencies.170 By contrast, the
dissenting opinion emphasized “due regard for the maintenance of our dual system of
government” which “demands that the courts do not diminish state power by extravagant
inferences regarding what Congress might have intended if it had considered the matter, or by
reference to their own conceptions of a policy which Congress has not expressed and is not
plainly to be inferred from the legislation which it has enacted.”171 Sixty years after Cloverleaf
Butter Company was decided, such arguments continue to be made on both sides of the
preemption debate.
The Court did not address another FDCA preemption case until 1985 in Hillsborough
County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.172 In the intervening years, the Court
decided a number of implied preemption cases. Importantly, in San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon,173 the Court was faced with an application of implied preemption doctrine to
state common law damages actions.174 San Diego Building Trades Council involved whether the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted state tort actions for damages by employers
allegedly injured in the course of peaceful picketing by labor activists.175 The Court spoke of the
difficulty of ascertaining congressional intent when the enacting Congress, writing twenty-five
years earlier, could not have foreseen the conflicts that would eventually arise.176 In finding
165
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implied preemption based on a conflict with federal legislative objectives, the Court relied on
two considerations: (1) the case involved national labor policy about which Congress had
legislated “with broad strokes,”177 and (2) state regulation can be exerted through common law
damages actions as effectively as through more direct regulatory means.178 These two features of
implied preemption analysis, how to define the federal objectives with which state law arguably
conflicts and the regulatory nature of common law damages actions, will be central to implied
preemption analysis under the FDCA.
In the 1980s, the Court refined its approach regarding the effect of common law damages
actions within implied preemption analysis. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,179 the Court was
called upon to determine whether the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),180 which regulated the nuclear
energy industry, permitted state common law damages actions as a means of concurrent state
regulation. Karen Silkwood alleged contamination with plutonium through irregularities at the
Kerr-McGee Corp. nuclear power plant where she worked and sought personal injury and
punitive damages under negligence and strict liability doctrines.181
The AEA was enacted in 1954 to free the nuclear energy industry from total federal
control and to provide for private involvement.182 Some limited regulatory authority was given to
the states which had never before had any authority over nuclear power.183 The states were
precluded, however, from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear material.184 Thus, the
preemption provision of the AEA carved out of federal dominion some small state regulatory
authority.
The Supreme Court concluded unanimously that the AEA did not preempt Silkwood’s
compensatory damages action.185 The Court, after reviewing the Act’s legislative history and
other congressional actions regarding the AEA,186 stated, “It is difficult to believe that Congress
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal
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conduct.”187 The regulatory effect of common law damages actions was recognized but
considered consistent with federal objectives in the absence of clear congressional intent to
prohibit them.
One year later, the Court addressed a preemption challenge under the FDCA, though not
one involving the regulatory effect of common law damages actions. In Hillsborough County
Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,188 a Florida county sought to regulate the
collection of blood plasma from paid donors by requiring additional limitations to those required
under federal regulations.189 The defendant blood plasma center argued for preemption under
both implied occupation of the field and conflict preemption.190 The Supreme Court disagreed
and reversed an appellate court finding of preemption.191
The Court, after describing the basic implied preemption doctrines applicable,192 noted
that the defendant “faces an uphill battle” in arguing for implied preemption. The hurdles to
preemption fell into two categories: (1) prior agency position against preemption;193 and (2) the
presumption that state or local regulation of matters related to health and safety can
constitutionally coexist with federal regulation.194
The Court rejected occupation of the field preemption even though the regulations were
comprehensive,195 noting that “merely because the federal provisions were sufficiently
comprehensive to meet the need identified by Congress did not mean that States and localities
were barred from identifying additional needs or imposing further requirements in the field.”196
The Court was “even more reluctant” to infer field preemption from regulations than from
statutes, saying, “To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a problem
comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency decides to step
into a field, its regulations will be exclusive.”197 The Court found persuasive that the FDCA had
neither altered its position on preemption since the regulations were originally enacted a decade
earlier, nor had the agency otherwise made its intentions clear regarding preemption.198 The
187
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federal interest was not so dominant to justify occupying the field given the historic primacy of
state regulation in matters of health and safety.199
Similarly, the Court rejected the implied conflict preemption argument.200 The Court
found the purported conflict to be speculative: the increased cost to plasma collection operators
and an increased burden on donors imposed under the local regulation did not necessarily
interfere with the federal goal of maintaining an adequate plasma supply.201 According to the
Court, neither Congress nor the FDA had struck a particular balance between safety and quantity;
rather, “the regulations which contemplated additional state and local requirements merely
establish minimum safety standards.”202 Finally, the Court noted that the FDA could promulgate
preemption regulations “with relative ease” but it had not done so.203 The Court attached
significance to the absence of either a FDA position or formal regulation on preemption.
Hillsborough County is a strong pro-state regulation preemption decision under the
FDCA. The Court had found preemption under the FDCA only in narrow cases involving
impossibility204 and those cases rested on shaky ground after the increasingly narrow definition of
actual conflict the Court began to use subsequent years.205 It appears that common law damages
actions would survive the preemption hurdles defined by the Court. If the local regulations at
issue in Hillsborough County did not create the kind of obstacle to federal objectives required to
preempt, the more indirect regulation of common law damages actions would surely not be
sufficient, particularly given the long tradition of permitting such actions.
C. The Rise of Express Preemption Doctrine and the FDCA: Of Cipollone and Medtronic
A short seven years after Silkwood, the Court would re-evaluate preemption doctrine as it
applied to common law damages actions. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,206 the Court,
applying preemption doctrine in a products liability action for the first time, concluded that
where Congress has included an express preemption provision, and that provision provides a
“reliable indicium of congressional intent,” the provision controls and an implied preemption
analysis is unnecessary.207 In such a case, the Court’s task was only to determine the scope of the
provision.208 Rarely had the Court given exclusive control to an express preemption provision,
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particularly as it applied to common law damages actions.209 Cipollone’s focus on defining the
scope of congressional intent narrowly out of respect for the presumption against preemption of
traditional state health and safety regulations and its discussion of the regulatory effect of
common law damages actions are important in the implied preemption context.
Cipollone involved the preemptive effect of the federal cigarette labeling and advertising
laws on products liability actions.210 The Court mentioned the presumption against federal
preemption of matters historically within the states’ police powers, and emphasized the
prominence of discerning congressional intent.211 The plurality opinion, written by Justice
Stevens, used the text of the provisions, which referred to state “requirements or prohibitions” as
forbidden, and the legislative history to preempt some, but not all, common law damages
actions.212 The plurality acknowledged that common law damages actions can have an indirect
regulatory effect213 but the dissenting justices recognized that the Court’s preemption cases “have
declined on several recent occasions to find the regulatory effects of state tort law direct or
substantial enough to warrant preemption.”214
In its next products liability preemption cases, the Court adhered to its Cipollone analysis
and exclusively analyzed the express preemption provisions of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA)215 and the Federal Railroad Safety Act.216 In both cases the
express preemption provisions were found not to preempt the damages actions in issue217 but the
Court left room for the operation of implied preemption principles in the event that Congress’
intent could not be clearly established from the express provision.218
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The Court’s next preemption opinion, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,219 involved preemption
under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the FDCA.220 The MDA directs the
FDA to regulate the safety and effectiveness of medical devices depending on the marketing
approval method and type of medical device involved.221 Congress included an express
preemption provision in the MDA which provides that states may not establish “any
requirement” which is “different from or in addition to” any FDA imposed requirement regarding
a device’s safety or effectiveness.222 In Medtronic, defendant sought preemption of plaintiff’s
design and manufacturing defect claims regarding its pacemaker because the device had been
approved through a pre-market notification process under the MDA.223 The Court was divided
on whether the MDA preempted the plaintiffs claims, but all justices agreed that the express
preemption provision controlled the analysis.224
The Court reiterated the historic primacy of state regulation “to protect the health and
safety of their citizens” which supports the “great latitude” states have had to govern in this
area.225 Consequently, the majority opinion precisely considered the language of the express
preemption provision.226 The pre-market notification process, under which the pacemaker had
been approved, did not include specific requirements.227 The plurality opinion concluded that
common law damages actions based on design or labeling defects were not “requirements” for
purposes of the statute, stating that “we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly
preempt state law causes of action. . . That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns
and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety.”228
A majority of the justices, four in dissent and Justice Breyer in concurrence, thought that
common law damages actions generally do impose requirements, and, therefore, may be
preempted under the statute if they differ from a federal requirement.229 Justice Breyer, whose
219
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opinion provided the final vote against preemption, complained of the “highly ambiguous” nature
of the preemption provision in issue which required that courts look elsewhere for help as to “just
which federal requirements preempt just which state requirements, as well as just how they might
do so.”230 Justice Breyer stated that express preemption provisions should be interpreted based
on their “clear congressional command,” if one exists. If none, courts may infer that the
“relevant administrative agency possess a degree of leeway” to proscribe the preemptive effect of
its regulations.231
All three Medtronic opinions explored the importance of agency position and
interpretation of agency regulations in determining the scope of preemption.232 The justices
disagreed on the extent to which they should rely on an agency’s position on preemption, though
in earlier cases the Court had noted that agency regulations could be informative on defining the
scope of preemption where consistent with statutory language.233 The FDA had adopted a
regulation explaining its position on the scope of MDA preemption234 consistent with the
authority granted to it by Congress to do so.235 The plurality opinion’s interpretation of the scope
of the preemption provision was “substantially informed” by the agency’s regulations236 because
of the “unique role”237 given to it by Congress to implement provisions of the Act.238 The
plurality, after comparing the state common law requirements to the “entirely generic concerns”
of the federal regulations, concluded that “these general [common law] obligations are no more a
threat to federal requirements than would be a state-law duty to comply with local fire prevention
regulations and zoning codes, or to use due care in the training and supervision of a work
force.”239
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Justice Breyer concurred, agreeing that “the relevant administrative agency possesses a
degree of leeway to determine which rules, regulations, or other administrative actions will have
pre-emptive effect.”240 In particular, the FDA has a “special understanding of the likely impact of
both state and federal requirements, as well as an understanding of whether (or the extent to
which) state requirements may interfere with federal objectives . . . The FDA can translate these
understandings into particularized pre-emptive intentions accompanying its various rules and
regulations.”241 Justice Breyer concluded that the express preemption provision did not fully
answer the preemption question.242 Consequently, he considered implied preemption principles
applicable, in conjunction with the FDA’s own regulatory understanding of preemption, to
conclude that there was no actual conflict between the federal requirements and the common law
“liability-creating premises” of state tort law.243
D. Implied Conflict Preemption and the FDCA: Of Geier and Buckman Co.
Justice Breyer authored the Court’s next opinion on the preemption of common law
damages actions, Geier v. American Honda Motor Company,244 which firmly reinstated implied
conflict preemption doctrine as central to preemption analysis. In Geier, the Court was asked to
analyze the effect of the express preemption provision in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (“NTMVSA”) on a lawsuit alleging that a 1987 Honda was defective in design
because it did not have a driver’s side air bag.245 The NTMVSA contains a preemption provision
which states that whenever a federal motor vehicle safety standard, “FMVSS,”246 is in effect,
states may not establish or continue in effect any “safety standard applicable to the same aspect
of performance” which is not identical to the federal standard.247 The statute also contains a
“savings clause:” “Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this
sub-chapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.”248
The Department of Transportation issued FMVSS 208 regarding Occupant Crash
Protection in 1967.249 After several revisions, the 1984 version, in issue in Geier, permitted
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manufacturers to choose, with some restrictions, between air bags and seat belt systems.250 Ms.
Geier’s 1987 Honda did not have a driver’s side air bag. She was injured as a result and sued the
manufacturer based on the vehicle’s defective design.251
Justice Breyer, writing the majority opinion, mirrored his analysis from Medtronic,
concluding that the express preemption provision did not preempt plaintiff’s common law
actions because that provision, read together with the savings clause, did not disclose
congressional intent to defeat product liability claims in the face of only a federal minimum
standard of safety.252 The Court then asked whether the savings clause also prevented the
operation of “ordinary pre-emption principles insofar as those principles instruct us to read
statutes as preempting state laws (including common law rules) that actually conflict with the
statute or federal standards promulgated thereunder?”253 The Court concluded it did not,
reasoning that it would be impermissible “to take from those who would enforce a federal law
the very ability to achieve the law's congressionally mandated objectives that the Constitution,
through the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles, seeks to protect.”254
The Court found that an “actual conflict”255 existed and thus plaintiff’s common law
actions were preempted.256 A number of factors were important in making that determination.
First, the Court rejected as conclusive the statutory definition of federal standards as “minimum”
standards of care.257 Instead, the Court reviewed carefully the objectives of the regulation itself.
In doing so, the views of the Secretary of Transportation were very influential.258 The Court
relied on comments to the standard and the current Secretary’s position, “through the Solicitor
General, [that] the 1984 version of FMVSS 208 ‘embodies the Secretary's policy judgment that
safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protection systems in their
fleets rather than one particular system in every car.’”259 The Court’s review of the regulation
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identified the Secretary’s efforts to balance a variety of concerns which impacted its primary
objective of consumer safety, including obstacles to consumer acceptance of restraint devices,
industry reluctance to adopt restraint devices, and Congress’ responses to a variety of public
pressures regarding the restraints.260
Second, in defining the federal objectives in issue, the Court relied to a significant extent
on the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s (NHTSA’s) position on the
matter.261 The Court justified its reliance on the agency’s position based on 1) the technical
subject matter; 2) the complex and extensive nature of the relevant history and background; and
3) the agency’s “uniquely qualified” position to comprehend the likely impact of state
requirements.262 The consistency of the Secretary of Transportation’s position on preemption
over time was also influential in permitting the considerable deference the Court showed to it.263
The Court weighed the stated federal objectives against the general interest that the states
have in promoting the health and welfare of citizens by compensating for personal injuries
suffered as a result of defective products. The Court did not mention the presumption against
preemption264 but it discussed the state’s general interest in the health and welfare of its
citizens.265 The Court was sympathetic to this important concern.266 Nevertheless, the Court was
of the strong opinion that the state and federal objectives could not be reconciled: “Such a state
law--i.e. a rule of state tort law imposing such a duty--by its terms would have required
manufacturers of all similar cars to install air bags rather than other passive restraint systems, . . .
It thereby would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of objectives that the federal
regulators sought.”267
Finally, the plaintiff argued that a jury finding of defectiveness based on the lack of an air
bag did not conflict with the federal objectives; indeed, state law promoted those objectives.268
While acknowledging that Congress intended some nonuniformity in the regulatory system it
created, the Court concluded that jury-assessed standards would lead to unpredictability and
uncertainty in the standard of due care.269 While acknowledging that “tort law may be somewhat
different, and that related considerations--for example, the ability to pay damages instead of
modifying one’s behavior--may be relevant for pre-emption purposes,”270 the Court found those
260
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considerations not to be persuasive in this instance.
The Court’s next preemption case again involved the Medical Device Amendments of the
FDCA. In Buckman Company v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee,271 the Court was called upon to
determine whether the MDA preempted the plaintiff’s fraud claim based on the defendant’s
misrepresentations to the FDA to obtain approval of its orthopedic bone screws.272 The Court
used implied conflict preemption principles without engaging in an express preemption analysis,
stating that the express preemption provision did not cover the matter so implied conflict
preemption must operate.273 Because policing fraud on a federal agency was not a subject which
states had traditionally governed, no presumption against preemption would operate unlike cases
involving the historic primacy of state regulation over other health and safety matters.274
The Court began by identifying federal objectives: the federal regulatory scheme
empowers the FDA to protect itself from and to deter fraud.275 The Court emphasized the need
for flexibility in enforcing that regulatory scheme given its other “difficult (and often competing)
objectives,” including generally protecting medical care practitioners from unnecessary
interference with the practice of medicine.276 The Court did not mention the FDA’s position on
the preemption issue, central to Medtronic and Geier, but the concurring opinion noted that the
FDA had waffled on the preemptive effect of its regulatory objectives on state fraud-on-the-FDA
claims.277
The Court then evaluated the state law interest at stake to determine whether an actual
conflict existed. The tort law deterrent effect could increase burdens on the medical device
industry, potentially discouraging the request for approval of devices that might have beneficial
off-label uses, in contravention of the stated goal of non-interference with medical practice.278
Similarly, the cost that recognizing state law fraud claims would impose on the industry could
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create approval delays of valuable devices, agency administrative inefficiency, and delay in the
provision of health care.279 The Court saw no corresponding benefit to the application of state
law because it was not based on a common law duty of care, but rather on a federal regulation.280
The Court noted, however, that a traditional state tort action might survive.281
E. Last Words on Implied Preemption Doctrine: Of Sprietsmaand Bates
The Court’s next two preemption opinions, Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine282 and Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences LLC283 provide additional insight into the Court’s implied conflict preemption
analysis though both involve express preemption provisions. Both cases address the importance
of agency position on preemption and the value of common law damages actions in regulating
conduct.
Sprietsma involved allegations of design defect against manufacturers of recreational
boats that did not have propeller guards.284 The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (“FBSA”)285
gave the Secretary of Transportation authority, delegated to the Coast Guard, to establish “a
coordinated national boating safety program” including authority to promulgate safety standards
for boating equipment to establish uniform safety regulations.286 The Coast Guard, after
gathering data and holding public hearings over a several year period, decided not to require such
guards for reasons of safety, feasibility and economics.287 Neither did the Coast Guard forbid the
use of such guards.288 In defense of Sprietsma’s claim of design defect, the manufacturer argued
that the Coast Guard’s decision not to require a propeller guard preempted plaintiff’s claim.289
The FBSA contains both an express preemption provision and a savings clause.290
The Court, consistent with Geier, found no express preemption and engaged in an
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implied conflict preemption analysis.291 The Court assessed the strength of the federal and state
governmental policies at stake to determine whether an actual conflict was presented. The Court
noted that the emphasis of Coast Guard regulations has been to preserve state authority pending
the adoption of specific federal regulations.292 The Coast Guard’s position on preemption,
therefore, was in favor of permitting state common law claims.293 While the Court noted that a
federal agency decision not to regulate might have preemptive force, the Court found no such
force in this case because of the more prominent safety objectives motivating the Coast Guard’s
decision.294
The Court’s most recent preemption decision involved express preemption principles but
the Court made some important, general observations about the delicate balance that must be
achieved in determining the scope of preemption. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,295 involved
whether common law tort actions challenging the labeling of defendant’s pesticide were
preempted under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).296 The lower
courts had found express preemption of all claims based on a statutory provision forbidding
states from imposing requirements for labeling “in addition to or different from” those required
under FIFRA.297 The lower courts reasoned that a jury finding under state law would induce the
defendant to alter its pesticide labeling which the Environmental Protection Agency had
approved (EPA).298 The EPA had taken inconsistent positions on preemption within the previous
five years, first in favor of the operation of state tort law, as proposed in an amicus brief
submitted in a prior case299 and then in favor of preemption as proposed in an amicus brief
submitted in Bates.300
The Court’s discussion of the history of FIFRA regulation reads much like the history of
FDCA regulation. For example, the Court notes that “Prior to 1910, the States provided the
primary and possibly the exclusive source of regulatory control over the distribution of poisonous
substances.”301 The history of the FDCA regarding drugs is virtually identical. In addition,
FIFRA imposes misbranding liability for labels that are false or misleading in any particular,302
just as the FDCA does for prescription drugs and devices. The inclusion in 1972 of an express
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preemption provision which governs the continuing role of the states in pesticide regulation is the
primary difference between the two statutory schemes.303 In addition, the EPA does not
determine or endorse the efficacy of pesticides it approves for marketing,304 unlike the FDA’s
drug approvals which do review the efficacy claims in drug applications.
The Court noted that courts have entertained tort litigation for decades against pesticide
manufacturers, both before and after the enactment of FIFRA in 1947, and that it was not until
after Cipollone in 1992 that a “groundswell” of preemption arguments based on FIFRA
preemption were advanced.305 The FIFRA regulatory scheme incorporates a significant role for
the states, but the express preemption provision required the Court to determine its scope
nevertheless. The Court found no preemption of most claims but remanded for further inquiry
regarding the labeling claims.306
The Court rejected the claim, relied on by the lower courts, that simply because a jury
verdict might have an effect on a manufacturer, that the damages action was therefore preempted
because it might induce a labeling change.307 “A requirement is a rule of law that must be
obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a
requirement.”308 Consequently, state law requirements that are “equivalent to or consistent with”
FIFRA regulations survived.309 Parallel requirements imposed on manufacturers under state and
federal law will provide an additional cause to comply with the federal requirements.310
The Court took a dim view of expansively reading Congress’ intent to preempt given “the
long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances” which “adds force
to the basic presumption against pre-emption.”311 The Court reiterated that if Congress had
intended to prevent the operation of “a long available form of compensation,” it surely would
have expressed that intent more clearly.312 Further, “private remedies that enforce federal
misbranding requirements would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA. . . .
FIFRA contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over time, as manufacturers gain more
information about their products’ performance in diverse settings,313 noting that tort suits can act
“as a catalyst” in this effort.314
303
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F. Synthesis of Preemption Doctrine
Building on the analysis of the Court’s recent preemption opinions, a number of
principles inform how the Court is likely to treat implied preemption regarding prescription drug
labeling. The presumption against preemption maintains vitality in cases involving traditional
areas of historic state power, as seen in Bates and Medtronic and confirmed in Buckman Co.,315
and is likely to be especially forceful in implied conflict preemption under the FDCA.
Determining whether an actual conflict exists will involve an assessment of the federal objectives
at stake, as identified through the legislation, its history, and the agency’s views on the scope of
the regulatory scheme, as evidenced particularly by Geier, Buckman Co., Sprietsma, and, to a
lesser extent, Bates.316 The position of the relevant government agency on the preemptive effect
of the regulations and the consistency of that position over time are related to those regulatory
objectives and are important in their assessment. As early as Hillsborough County, the
importance of the FDA’s position on preemption, and the consistency of that position, is clear.317
While federal regulatory action reflects a balancing of objectives with implementing
choices, the importance of maintaining a particular balance has tipped the scales in favor of
implied conflict preemption, as was the case in Geier but not in Sprietsmaor Bates, consistent
with the Supremacy Clause’s command that federal legislation is supreme. Whether state tort
claims actually conflict or whether they operate in a complementary way with the prescription
drug labeling scheme will require close attention to the details of the regulatory scheme. Do such
claims fall within the boundaries of federal regulation or outside them?
IV. DISCOVERING THE BOUNDARIES OF FEDERAL PRESCRIPTION DRUG
LABELING PREEMPTION
A. The Arguments for Implied Conflict Preemption
The FDA has asserted three basic reasons why it supports preemption based on
prescription drug labeling. First, the FDA’s objectives, as the expert federal agency charged with
insuring public health and safety, are impacted by the operation of state tort laws because of the
sensitive balance that its labeling regulations achieve. The FDA asserts that permitting jury
verdicts based on approved labeling will impact that balance by encouraging manufacturers to
warn physicians of unsubstantiated risks and thereby make inappropriate medical treatment
decisions. The potential over-warning of risks may also deter the use of an otherwise beneficial
drug in circumstances when it is advised. Further, the FDA considers its labeling regulations to
achieve, in some cases, more than a minimum standard. The FDA now considers those
regulations, in most cases, to be optimal, or ceiling standards, from which deviation is neither
required nor permitted absent specific FDA approval. The FDA’s proposed final rule on labeling
315See supra notes and accompanying text. The presumption against preemption has also surfaced as “an assumption of non-preemption” that is not triggered in
areas of significant federal presence. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)(involving preemption of state policies regarding Burma; foreign affairs
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316
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incorporates these general considerations, as well as the more specific concern that in some
instances, a manufacturer will be subject to a misbranding allegation if it satisfies a state
common law damages action and alters a label that subsequently does not meet with FDA
approval.
Motus v. Pfizer, Inc.,318 well illustrates the arguments being made for implied conflict
preemption for prescription drug labeling.319 The FDA studied the alleged association between
SSRI anti-depressants and the risk of suicide on a number of separate occasions, both before and
during the approval process for Zoloft.320 Zoloft was first approved in 1991 and subsequently
approved for four additional medical conditions.321 During those subsequent approvals, the FDA
determined on each occasion that a stronger warning of the causal connection between use of
SSRIs and the risk of suicide was not necessary.322 The FDA never prohibited Pfizer or other
SSRI manufacturers from altering the labeling, however,323 though the common practice is for
manufacturers not to alter labels without prior FDA approval. Based on its conclusions, the FDA
argued in Motus that a common law damages action based on the alleged inadequacy of the
warning of the risk of suicide would directly conflict with the FDA regulations because any label
other than the one approved by the FDA would be misleading and, therefore, would constitute
misbranding under the FDCA.324
The FDA asserted more generally that, given its objective “to ensure each drug’s optimal
use through requiring scientifically substantiated warnings,” a common law tort action would
frustrate those purposes.325 The FDA expressed concern for the potential “under-utilization of a
drug based on dissemination of scientifically unsubstantiated warnings, so as to deprive patients
of beneficial, possibly lifesaving treatment.”326 According to the FDA, a common law tort action
might encourage the use of a warning that would diminish the impact of valid warnings,
“creating an unnecessary distraction.”327
Each of these concerns, under-utilization of an effective drug, dilution of otherwise valid
warnings from over-warning, and the potential misbranding violations that may result, are the
federal objectives identified in the proposed final labeling regulation on which implied conflict
318
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preemption is based.328 The next sub-section analyzes how these objectives will fare under the
Court’s implied conflict preemption principles when compared to the state tort principles with
which they are alleged to conflict.
B. Application of Implied Conflict Preemption
Based on preemption doctrine as it has evolved both under the FDCA and generally, the
circumstances of prescription drug labeling raise the following issues to be resolved. First, how
are the federal objectives to be defined in the case of prescription drug labeling with which state
tort laws arguable conflict? Second, what is the effect of the presumption that historic state
regulation in the field of public health and safety is not preempted absent clear congressional
intent? Third, does the indirect regulatory effect of common law damages actions actually,
directly conflict with the objectives of the prescription drug labeling regulatory regime, either in
general or more specifically based on a particular labeling requirement? Subsumed in this third
question are the sub-issues of whether FDA regulations set minimum or maximum standards, the
nature of the acquisition of scientific evidence of risk information regarding the use of
prescription drugs on such standards, and the effect of the FDA’s recently altered position on
preemption.
1. Federal Objectives of the Prescription Drug Labeling Regulations
As early as Savage v. Jones329 and McDermott v. Wilson,330 the objective of the food and
drug laws has been clear: to protect the public health and safety from adulterated and misbranded
drugs.331 The FDA, as the undisputed expert federal public health agency charged with insuring
the safety and efficacy of the nation’s drug supply,332 must be permitted to satisfy its public
health mission substantially unimpeded. The federal objectives of public safety, however, are not
inconsistent with the historic primacy of the states in the field of public health and safety.
Because Congress has not expressed its intent to preempt state regulation, even though it is
capable of doing just that, the states have continued to be free to fulfill their historic and primary
regulatory role.333
Had Congress desired to alter that balance it could have enacted a general FDCA
preemption provision, or one directed toward prescription drug labeling, but it has not. On a
number of occasions in the federal food and dug laws, beginning with the Medical Device
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Amendments of 1976,334 Congress has written such express preemption provisions. That it has
not done so in the case of prescription drug labeling suggests, at the least, that it is aware of the
current regulatory status quo and is content to leave it alone, including permitting its authorized
agency to address the matter. Even though congressional intent is not directly in issue, the fact
that Congress has not defined a specific preemptive scope in this area suggests that federal
objectives to be considered in determining the implied preemptive scope of authorized
regulations should be carefully circumscribed. Such was the case in Geier in which the Court
was influenced by the particularized federal objectives which supported finding an actual
conflict between the specific “variety and mix” of passive restraint systems required and tort
actions based on a different manufacturer choice. The “long history of tort litigation”335 in the
prescription drug labeling area, and the oft-repeated view that Congress would not defeat the
operation of “a long available form of compensation” without making its intent to do so clear336
support the requirement of clear, particularized federal objectives to which implied conflict
preemption principles are applied in the prescription drug labeling context.337
As in Hillsborough County, those seeking to preempt state health and safety regulations,
therefore, have an “uphill battle.”338 “Strong evidence” is needed to defeat the presumption that
state health laws are not preempted,339 either in their entirety, through a federal occupation of the
field340 or through actual conflict. When implied conflict preemption is in issue, therefore,
federal objectives must be defined on a narrow, particularized basis341 as a way of insuring that
an unnecessarily broad definition is not used to usurp state regulation where Congress has not
expressed its intent to do so. The Court, therefore, has been restrictive in its definition of what
constitutes an “actual, direct” conflict with federal objectives.342 General observations about the
334
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possible negative implications of common law tort actions on the regulatory scheme should be
unpersuasive.
2. The Presumption Against Preemption
The Court has recently struggled with whether the presumption against preemption of
state police powers regulation is relevant in express preemption analysis because congressional
intent to preempt is directly in issue.343 The importance of the presumption against preemption in
the implied preemption context is much less clear because the Court does not discuss it in the
same way. As congressional intent is not specifically in issue, the presumption against
preemption becomes useful in defining whether an actual conflict is present.
For example, in Hillsborough County, the Court considered the presumption against
preemption to apply strongly and defeat implied field preemption.344 Regarding conflict
preemption, the Court was less concerned with the presumption because it found no evidence of
an actual conflict with federal objectives because those stated objectives were too speculative to
be credited.345 Had the agency’s position been made clearer, the Court would then have had to
assess the value of the presumption against preemption in defining whether an actual conflict
existed.
The Court did not mention the presumption at all when discussing implied conflict
preemption in Geier, though it was certainly interested in the importance of state tort law as an
important mechanism to address health and safety concerns regarding automobile passive
restraint design.346 In Buckman Co., the Court rejected the notion that a presumption operated
because the subject of regulation, policing fraud on the FDA, was not an area historically within
the state’s police power. The Court noted, however, that it might treat a traditional state tort
action differently.347
One is left with some uncertainty as to the importance of the presumption against
preemption as such. It is clear, however, that in assessing whether an actual conflict exists, the
Court clearly considers the importance of traditional state regulation in the particular subject area
as a strong counter weight to the stated federal objectives in the balance. For example, in
Sprietsma, the Court rejected a finding of implied conflict preemption when a federal agency had
decided not to regulate precisely because state tort actions had traditionally operated as a means
of increasing incentives toward safety.348 The Court refused to permit an expert regulatory
assessment to have greater effect than necessary. Arguably, an FDA decision not to require a
particular warning in prescription drug labeling should be considered in the same fashion.
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343
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In addition, the Court was openly hostile toward the proposed rejection of “longstanding”
principles of tort compensation in Bates.349 The Court confirmed its dedication to the
presumption against preemption in assessing Congress’ intent and noted that “private remedies . .
. would seem to aid, rather than hinder” the functioning of a public health and safety regulatory
scheme.350 Bates involved a labeling approval regime of less rigor than the FDA’s but the
scheme in Bates also involved an express preemption provision which the Court was called upon
to interpret. The concerns for the operation of traditional state tort principles expressed in Bates
would seem to apply, a fortiori, more persuasively in the case of implied conflict preemption
under the FDCA.
3. Do state tort actions actually conflict with the proposed federal objectives?
The stated federal objectives behind the prescription drug labeling regulation do not
actually conflict with state common law tort actions. The main general objective, protection of
the public health, is not in conflict with state tort actions but operates in a complementary way
with them. There is no reason, other than the FDA’s change position on preemption, to now treat
common law tort actions differently than in the traditional way.
The FDA proposes, however, that because labeling approval is solely within the FDA’s
authority, state common law tort actions may interfere with the balance of risks that undergird
that approval. The concern of overwarning and the possible disincentive created to prescribe an
otherwise appropriate drug are at the core of this argument. Has the FDA’s balance established
an optimal one, as the Court suggest had occurred in Geier, or has the FDA’s balance simply
established a minimum as has traditionally been the case.?
The FDA’s authority to approve prescription drug labeling has not changed; its desire to
use preemption based on that approval authority is all that has changed. The Court’s implied
conflict preemption doctrine rejects such a change as insignificant in itself to support preemption.
The FDA’s change in position regarding preemption is too recent and too tied to specific
litigation to constitute the kind of formal, long standing agency position which has been credited
in conflict preemption analysis. In neither Sprietsma, Bates , nor Easterwood was such a change
in agency position credited.351 Bates and Easterwood involved express preemption provisions as
to which greater deference to agency interpretations might have been appropriate and the Court
refused to credit it.352
In Medtronic, the plurality was “substantially informed” by the FDA’s position on
preemption because Congress had expressly provided authority to the FDA to determine when
state regulations would be preempted.353 The Court did not acknowledge that it was required to
give any level of deference to the FDA’s interpretation of its preemption authority; Justice
349See supra notes and accompanying text.
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O’Connor in dissent noted uncertainty as to whether any deference was required in such
circumstances.354
In contrast to Medtronic, there is no formal preemption regulation in the new prescription
drug labeling regulation. There is only commentary in the preamble. There has been no
comment from the health care community at large, either physicians or their organizations, or
state public health officials, or industry representatives for that matter, on the FDA’s formal
position in favor of preemption. The proposed regulation specifically disclaimed any intent to
alter the FDA’s formal position on preemption, and, rather, simply asked for comments on the
product liability implications of the proposed labeling regulation.355 The new preemption
position is really only a re-articulation of the FDA’s recent litigation positions in a few amicus
briefs and not a formal regulatory policy adopted after notice and comment rule-making.
Describing the change in position as a longstanding, formal regulatory policy is a misnomer that
the Court’s implied conflict preemption doctrine will see through.
An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is ordinarily accorded great deference.356
The degree of that deference has been the subject of much discussion in the Court’s preemption
opinions, including the opinions involving the FDA.357 Generally, though, the degree of
deference due to government positions depends on, among other things, consistency, formality,
and thoroughness.358 Briefs are not accorded great policy deference,359 particularly when the
FDA interprets statutes or regulations in a particular case, “at such a time and in such a manner
so as to provide a convenient litigating position” for a particular action.360 Its efforts to obtain
greater deference in the MDA context has met with limited success361 precisely because the FDA
is interpreting its own regulation on preemption. That is not the case in the prescription drug
labeling context.
The FDA’s historical position in favor of the concurrent operation of traditional state tort
354
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claims is a significant barrier to recognition of its current preemption position as consistent with
federal objectives. The Court has looked with disfavor on changed agency position, particularly
for litigation purposes, as support for conflict preemption. Only in Geier in which the Court
found implied conflict preemption, was agency position persuasive and that was based on the
Secretary of Transportation’s unwavering position on the importance of the federal objectives in
issue.362 In the railroad safety regulation cases,363 the agency’s change in preemption position
was rejected as inconsistent with the statutory scheme and, thus, of no effect in the express
preemption analysis. While agency position is given some deference, in the case of implied
conflict preemption of traditional state tort actions, consistency of position is more important
than recency of position in assessing actual conflict.
Furthermore, in the labeling context, the dynamic nature of the scientific understanding of
risk disfavors preemption. In Bates involving labeling of pesticides, the Court refused to give
broad scope to the preemption provision in issue because doing so would stifle an otherwise
dynamic need to continually evaluate risks about which warnings should be provided. Inertia is a
powerful force: if preemption exists based on labeling choices, why would any manufacturer ever
suggest a warning change? The onus would be on the FDA to police the scientific advances
regarding each prescription drug it has approved and then propose warning label changes where
necessary. Such an obligation is inconsistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme and with
the FDA’s limited resources to regulate a large number of prescription drug manufacturers.
Indeed, many commentators have complained of the FDA’s inability to obtain full
information from prescription drug manufacturers because the reporting process regarding
adverse reaction events is to weak. The FDA does not have authority to require additional
clinical trials after drug approval. Consequently, many have argued that the tort litigation system
acts as an important avenue by which the health care community learn of safety and efficacy
information.364
One example will illustrate the weakness of the FDA regulatory system that will weigh
against preemption. Merck & Co. received approval from the FDA to market its antiinflammatory drug Vioxx for use in treating arthritis pain in February 1999.365 In June 2000,
Merck submitted data to the FDA disclosing a four-fold higher risk of heart attacks compared to
another pain-reliever, but not until April 2002 did the FDA approve a new warning that referred
to an increase in cardiovascular risks.366 Merck voluntarily recalled Vioxx from the market in
362
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September 2004 because results of a clinical trial indicated a doubled risk of cardiac events in
those who used Vioxx.367 After Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market in October 2004,
Congress held hearings on the FDA’s alleged regulatory failure to require additional warnings
sooner.368 The FDA spokesman stated the FDA needed more regulatory authority to add warning
labels after safety concerns surface after a drug is approved. The Vioxx warning label change
was delayed for one year while the FDA and Merck negotiated over it.
While the current practice may be that manufacturers wait for FDA approval before
making labeling changes, that practice does not, nor should it, prevent manufacturers from acting
on risk information. The statute imposes on such manufacturers a greater obligation for the
public safety. Tolerating, or ignoring, a failure to fulfill that obligation is inconsistent with the
statutory mandate. The FDA may tolerate the practice of permitting manufacturers to wait until a
labeling change is approved, but permitting common law tort actions to operate concurrently
does not conflict with either the statutory or regulatory mandate that requires more.
Manufacturers may be more likely to seek FDA approval of a labeling change, pursuant to the
obligation to add significant risk information unilaterally, based on scientific evidence when it
becomes available.
Preemption based on an FDA approved label will create a disincentive to act promptly
based on acquired evidence of risk. Adverse side effects and evidence of increased risk come to
drug manufacturers in a wide variety of ways.369 The FDA approves or requires labels in the face
of a variety of such information submitted to it by manufacturers.370 The FDA relies on its
product manufacturers to provide the information required under its regulations.371 The FDA is
not an investigative agency; it is a regulatory agency. It, like other regulatory agencies, receives
information from members of the industry it regulates and acts on that information. It typically
does not actively seek out information to accomplish these goals unless information is brought to
it highlighting a need to do so, and it does not have the authority to require manufacturers to
engage in clinical trials to obtain that information.372
In the case of Zoloft, citizen petitions were presented to the FDA on three occasions
seeking to convince the FDA to require an enhanced label regarding the risk of suicidality.373
The FDA refused to require such a label until 2004 when it issued a public health advisory to that
effect. The FDA asked manufacturers for information about pediatric studies on other antidepressants and ultimately acknowledged that additional data and analysis were needed,
including increased public discussion. This information was slow to materialize and were it not
for the actions of non-manufacturers, it might never have. If preemption were permitted, and no
common law tort action had been available to bring some of this information to light, the
warning might not yet be provided. The incentives provided by the tort system are a necessary
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complement to the federal objectives of public safety and not an impediment to them.
The FDA’s final argument that its regulations are optimal, not minimum, standards is
inconsistent with the regulatory scheme it administers. Given that manufacturers may
unilaterally alter warnings when substantial risk information comes to them, coupled with the
FDA’s inability to require stronger warnings absent the regulated manufacturers coming forward
with such information of need substantially undercuts any argument that the labeling regulation
was intended to provide a maximum standard of care. The FDA’s regulatory scheme is quite
unlike the air bag regulation in Geier which specifically permitted alternative design choices to
the industry for specific means-related objectives that had been the subject of lengthy study and
compromise with full information of risk.374 In the case of prescription drug labeling, there is
unlikely ever to be full information of risk on which to base the conclusion that any labeling
should be considered a maximum, or optimal, one.
Finally, the FDA has suggested that particularized labeling decisions preempt common
law tort actions challenging those particularized labeling decisions, as in the case of Zoloft. The
FDA argues that its concern for over-warning supports implied conflict preemption of any
common law tort claim that would require a specific warning that the FDA has evaluated and not
required. Government agency’s typically argue for preemption based on generally applicable
regulatory decisions, such as the air bag regulation in Geier or the propeller guard regulation in
Sprietsma. It is unusual for a federal agency to argue for preemption based on an isolated
decision that affects one regulated industry member. In Bates, the defendant Dow Agrosciences
LLC argued for preemption based on its specific label that the EPA had permitted, but the Court
found that common law tort actions based on that label’s inadequacies could proceed if the state
requirements were parallel to those imposed under federal law, consistent with the express
preemption provision in issue.375 To argue for preemption based on the labeling required for a
particular prescription drug would extend implied conflict preemption to any particularized
federal government decision that might be made.
Implied conflict preemption based on one manufacturer’s approved drug labeling would
be an expansive application of the Court’s conflict preemption doctrine. It is possible, however,
that under the proposed new labeling regulation, such a result might ensue as it applies to new or
recently approved products. The labeling regulation more narrowly defines those circumstances
in which manufacturers may unilaterally alter a warning.376 In such a case, FDA approval of a
specific label might be considered to reflect the specific balance of risk and benefit regarding the
label’s content that supports implied conflict preemption. The new, more specific, labeling
regulation which contains more specific labeling requirements and makes it more difficult to
change a label could constitute the specific balance between an over-warning concern and the
desire minimally to interfere with the provision of medical care. A specifically defined
regulatory balance could constitute the kind of specific federal objective that the Court
recognized as preempting state common law tort actions in Geier.
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The FDA’s position on preemption, applied not retroactively but prospectively, in such
cases might one day be characterized as a consistent agency position on preemption for those
prescription drugs which fall within it. The concern for over-warning balanced against the
concern that FDA regulations not unnecessarily interfere with the provision of medical care
might constitute the narrow means-related objectives that would support implied conflict
preemption of state common law tort claims. That day has not arrived, however, regarding those
prescription drugs which are regulated under the FDA’s long-standing position against
preemption.
V. CONCLUSION
The FDA’s new labeling regulation makes many significant changes to prescription drug
labeling to enable clearer, more concise prescribing information to come to medical care
providers. But it is clear that no labeling regulation can create the perfect incentive for
manufacturers to seek better and more complete information regarding the adverse side effects of
the prescriptions we take. In a world where United States patients receive proper medical care
from doctors and nurses only 55 percent of the time,377 pharmaceutical companies are in control
of the research conducted on their products pre- and post-marketing,378 pharmaceutical sales
representatives have increasing influence on the drugs that physicians prescribe,379 and the
pharmaceutical industry is the largest lobbying group in the United States,380 the products liability
litigation system is a critical component to create incentives for greater access to risk information
to insure the public’s health.
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